## **AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD**

ANSI/ISA-61511-2-2018 / IEC 61511-2:2016

Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 2: Guidelines for the application of IEC 61511-1:2016 (IEC 61511-2:2016, IDT)

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ISA 67 T.W. Alexander Drive P.O. Box 12277 Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27709 E-mail: standards@isa.org

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